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The United States and other nations in addition to working through standing alliances have increasingly used ad hoc coalitions to effectively counter threats and ultimately protect their vital national interests. They do so to confront substantially different threats than those posed by nation states in the past century. Emerging from rogue nations, failed states, ungoverned spaces, and trans-national terrorist organizations, these threats are potentially more dangerous than old foes because they defy deterrence norms and other elements of statecraft.
International organizations have been increasingly challenged in addressing these threats. A lack of political will amongst their members, ineffective enforcement mechanisms, and insufficient capacity to act have raised questions about the utility and relevance of these organizations. Are these organizations still relevant? If so, then how is legitimacy conferred and how does the United States determine the legitimacy of its actions in future conflict?
This SRP considers the path the United States should pursue in seeking international legitimacy for unilateral intervention or when forming ad hoc coalitions to defend its national interests.
ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS OF THE WILLING: U.S. LEGITIMACY IN FUTURE CONFLICT
The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred.
-Harry S. Truman 1 In the current era of globalization, the United States finds itself in a situation where its security interests are inextricably tied to the broader security of the international system. 2 It seems unlikely this situation is one that the United States would have chosen as a just reward for victory in the Cold War. Even so, President Barack
Obama realizes that threats, challenges, and opportunities are not typically of one's own choosing; he has observed that this situation calls upon the United States to provide visionary leadership. 3 Moreover, the events of the past decade have demonstrated truly that "the world remains a dangerous place -in some respects, more so now than when the superpowers glared at each other across the Elbe." 4 And while "nuclear Armageddon is far less likely today, the actual use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) -nuclear, chemical, and biological -has become a very real and immediate threat."
This new era is not only characterized by a lone super power with tremendous leadership responsibilities but also by a meteoric rise of nationalism amongst ethnic and religious groups within countries that were previously suppressed under the bipolar environment of the Cold War. 5 Non-state actors such as Al Qaeda are the most dangerous of these threats. These violent extremist organizations (VEO) have rightly been judged to be beyond deterrence, since their members are willing to die for their cause rather than be captured and submit to the political systems that they oppose. 6 When confronted with these threats that jeapordize U.S. vital national interests, U.S. citizens expect their government to employ all elements of national power to intervene on their behalf to defend the nation's interests, both at home and abroad.
Indeed, some Americans expect our leaders to intervene abroad in stuations that do not involve national security; rather they believe that such interventions are warranted because our national values require such actions. 7 
Strategic Environment
Each of these situations presents unique challenges to an international system that is designed to protect the sovereignty of all nations and condones armed action only when it is used for self-defense, not to satisfy morality and value systems issues. How should the United States respond to acts of aggression or assist in maintaining order in the international community when any action beyond self defense is widely perceived as not being legitimate? This Strategy Research Project (SRP) explores this issue by examining the current strategic environment, by considering the relevance and effectiveness of current alliances and coalitions, and by analyzing recent U.S. policies regarding legitimacy of its use of force.
It concludes with recommendations for dealing with this problem.
The strategic environment challenging the U.S. today and for the foreseeable future is defined by "a global struggle against a violent extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the international state system." This environment has been described by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in the 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and in the recent 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In these strategic documents,
Gates cites a "variety of irregular challenges, the quest by rogue states for nuclear weapons, and the rising military power of other states." 8, 9 This violent extremist ideology presents irregular challenges and a threat that is distinctly different from the terrorist threats of the past. The current threat is posed largely by a radical Islamist movement that is substantially different from terroristic threats in Western Europe thirty years ago. The noted scholar of terrorism Bruce
Hoffman observed that these religiously oriented terrorists are unconstrained by the standards that have controlled the acts of previous generations of secular terrorists.
This is particularly true of apocalyptical groups like Al Qaeda and its ideological allies:
"No longer can we assume, as was said some years ago, that terrorists want 'a few people dead and a lot of people watching.' In addition, the fruits of globalization have enabled terrorists to achieve a lot of people dead and to do so almost anywhere in the world." 10 Terrorists' penchant for destruction, coupled with the interrelated vulnerabilities created by globalization, "has transformed the process of technological innovation while lowering entry barriers for a wider range of actors to acquire advanced technologies.
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In short, terrorists have acquired a remarkable capability to project power in the manner demonstrated by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001. 12 It has taken a decade for the U.S. to begin to understand the immediacy of this new threat. Today's terrorist organizations seek to use weapons of mass destruction not as weapons of last resort, but as weapons of first choice. Ultimately, the threat posed by a state-sponsored or a non-state, trans-national terrorist organization is the wanton destruction of its enemies. These organizations do not have a risk-averse mentality like that of our Cold War enemies. Rather, they have proven to be immune to the traditional protocols of statecraft and the associated concepts of deterrence.
13,14
Gates contends that to address this challenge, the U.S. must also react to the difficulties posed by "ungoverned, undergoverned, misgoverned, and contested areas that this commitment was tempered by the reality that most alliances lack the capacity to lead, the ability to muster consensus amongst their members, and the capability to act quickly and effectively. As a result, these organizations must often be augmented by a coalition of the willing. 18 In much the same vein, and after carefully studying several national security challenges, President Barack Obama has come to realize, much as his predecessors did, that when current alliances or international organizations cannot effectively respond to new situations, the nation must be prepared to act unilaterally to defend its national interests. But, when it does, it must do so in accordance with international standards.
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International Alliances: Failure of Promise and Purpose?
As the United States moves forward in this environment, strategists must carefully scrutinize existing international alliances with respect to their effectiveness and continued relevance.
Regarding the utility of international organizations and the stability they provide, Henry Kissinger observed that it "depends on the degree to which they reconcile what makes the constituent societies feel secure with what they consider just." 20 Throughout history, nations have sought strategic alliances and partnerships not because of some altruistic vision of international order and the desire to subjugate one's nation to a collective system, but rather out of national self interest in order to achieve a modicum of security and stability in an uncertain world. In her confirmation testimony to become the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), Susan Rice commented that the United States has been no different in this regard. She noted that it was "in the aftermath of the destruction and devastation of World War II [that] the United States provided the leadership and vision that led to the founding of the United Nations." 21 In addition to the UN, the U.S. and its European allies, in the wake of World War II, also formed another key strategic partnership, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Conceived primarily as a collective political organization, NATO proved to be an effective security alliance during the Cold War. The capabilities and actions of these two specific alliances, along with the occasional need for augmentation by ad hoc coalitions, will be further explored in the context of the strategic environment.
First, consider the differences between alliances and coalitions: "An alliance is a relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members." On the other hand, "a coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Coalitions are formed by different nations with different objectives, usually for a single occasion or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest." 22 Also, as the term coalition has taken on broader meanings with regard to unity of action in specific operations, the use of the phrase "ad hoc" with coalition is not necessarily redundant. "Ad hoc" provides a distinction between coalitions provided by permanent organizations (alliances) and those made up of temporary organizations formed for specific action -coalitions of the willing.
As the current preeminent international organization, the UN espouses values that many nations endorse and perhaps share. As a collective, it declares all nations to be sovereign equals; it pursues peaceful resolution of disputes and pledges a noninterventionist posture as it seeks to build a stronger global security environment.
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During the initial Cold War years of the organization, the bipolar security environment of the two great super powers (U.S. and USSR) provided a sort of "bleak stability:[in which] alignments, fidelities, and rivalries were sharply defined."
The UN also serves as a level playing field: It provides equal representation and a voice to many nations that otherwise would not be able to provide meaningful input to regional or international issues affecting them.
24
A further historical view of UN challenges reveals the organization's struggle to be decisive and relevant when it matters the most: in response to armed aggression of has ultimately "failed to fulfill the underlying premise of collective security -the prevention of war and collective resistance to aggression." 25 In each of two major periods of UN history -the post-World War II (Cold War) and post-Cold War -, the organization has arguably not lived up to the promise of its
Charter, but none-the-less has provided some semblance of order. During the Cold War, this order was manifest in the relative stability provided by a bipolar environment.
And while the bipolar world posed its own uncertainties, in retrospect it appears to have been substantially more stable than the pervasive uncertainty that characterizes the post-Cold War security environment. This current environment, with its vast array of threats and rapid rises in nationalism from previously suppressed groups, has provided new challenges to the UN, which it seems largely unable to address. Ironically, the current volatile environment has caused many people to overlook the relative ineffectiveness of the UN during the Cold War period.
Since the end of the Cold War, the UN's credibility has continued to suffer. There is no greater evidence of this than the UN mission to Rwanda that failed to quell a genocide. So notable was this failure that even the UN Secretary General (UNSG) Kofi
Annan remarkably admitted that, despite the presence of UN forces in the country at the time, they were not equipped to and they did not have the mandate to use force to stop the genocide. Even though the UN did not intervene in a timely fashion in Rwanda, it was the U.S. and other hemispheric powers in Europe that were heavily criticized for not intervening to stop that humanitarian crisis. Though the U.S. determined that the events in Rwanda were not sufficiently in its vital national interests to intervene, it is arguable that certain regional European nations or other African nations should have intervened on the behalf of the Tutsi people to restore regional stability and stop the genocide.
Beyond the criticism of individual nations, this situation shows that, if powers in the UN like the U.S. are not willing to intervene, then the organization is essentially powerless to intervene effectively because its leading nations are unwilling to act and because it lacks the autonomous capacity to act itself.
In another example of ineffective UNSC action, during a period that spanned the waning years of the Cold War (1976-1991), the organization issued numerous resolutions regarding aggression and intervention by Indonesian forces in East Timor.
Despite these edicts, UN inaction and the lack of will amongst the international community allowed an estimated 230,000 out of 630,000 people to perish due to disease, famine, or military action against the East Timorese. 26 While heralding the successes of the Australian's in East Timor, UNSG Annan has advocated for increased capability and capacity for UN peacekeepers in the form of standing forces and dedicated assets. But the Secretary General's advocacy has drawn the wrong lesson from this regional intervention.
Eventually, the Australian government did successfully lead a coalition of the willing in an armed intervention that stopped the loss of life and ultimately relieved the suffering in East
Timor. This Australian-led ad hoc coalition, had no clear mandate from the Security Council. Instead, Australia's regional leadership and assessment that its national interests were in fact dependent on regional security led to this successful intervention.
In effect, Australia's perception of its national interests led to a long-delayed peace enforcement and humanitarian operation. represented the political initiative that must be performed by nations when their specific national interests are not readily apparent. 30 Ultimately, the decision to participate in multinational operations is a calculated political decision that reflects participants' differing degrees of national interests, which then results in varying levels of commitment by coalition members. Many of these operations were deemed to be in U.S. national interests, vital or otherwise. Consequently, various levels of direct involvement by American military forces were determined to be appropriate. 33 The appropriateness and ability for NATO to intervene has been confirmed in the past two decades. But while the alliance demonstrated its resolve during the Yugoslavia/Balkan war, as Joseph Nye observed, in order to keep the NATO alliance viable, it had to go "out of area or out of business." 34 Even so, in many cases it was evident that the alliance had ostensibly been an action arm for UN-sanctioned Therefore, interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states defies the nonintervention principles and fundamental norms of state sovereignty. And because it cuts to the heart of the international system, the decision to use force or conduct an armed intervention is typically denounced in international law and is directly prohibited by the UN Charter. are only binding on those nation-states that are signatories to the treaty. 43 However,
nations that agree to a treaty with reservations during the ratification process or those that withdraw from a treaty with proper notification are not strictly bound by the treaty. By this standard, it is reasonable to assume that a sovereign entity may be held responsible for the actions of non-state actors operating inside their territory. 45 Providing further specificity, a spectrum of intervention indicates the degree of coercion sanctioned by international law. Let us consider only uses of force in the domestic affairs of another entity, issues of sovereignty not withstanding. Additionally, this use of force will be considered in a post jus ad bellum context, beyond the determination that the intervention has been initially justified. This distinction is made to facilitate a policy-making rather than a legal limitations of uses of force discussion. The question of capacity and the ability to lead and maintain ad hoc coalitions are the principal strategic issues. With the greatest capacity to act and to project power, the US is naturally called upon to lead efforts in the international community-or at least to provide key enablers so that others may act. So, regardless of the threat, the ability of the UN to act is limited to the capacity and will of its member nations. If nations with considerable capacity, like U.S., determine that intervention in the internal affairs of another nation is not in its national interest, then, it is unlikely that they will be compelled to lead or participate in UN-sanctioned actions.
And while this may seem to be a major obstacle in mounting international efforts to remedy international threats, U.S. citizens must understand that not all interventions require U.S. leadership or participation. Other nations may be better suited for specific operations, either because of regional security objectives or because their interests are directly involved. This was illustrated by the Australian-led intervention East Timor.
Ultimately, given its lack of capacity and the great variance in national interests of key nations, the UN has realized that it can more effectively sanction interventions by coalitions of the willing (again, the Australian example) or by regional security alliances (the formation of ISAF by UNSC Resolution; ultimately exercised by NATO).
Recommendations / Conclusion
The early history of the UN and NATO and recent post-9/11 actions have demonstrated that these institutions formed in the wake of World War II have not always been responsive and effective. The debate will continue regarding the existing alliance structure of the UN and NATO and their relevance for addressing emerging threats outside of the state system. Although, these organizations may seem outdated and unresponsive to some, they continue to provide a useful framework for the resolution of traditional international system-state problems as well as global problems that transcend the state system and sometimes call national sovereignty into question.
In order to protect and preserve its vital national interests, the United States should continue to work through the existing alliance structure to address the threats posed in the current complex and dynamic security environment. Furthermore, the nation's policy tools and legal instruments will remain the key means for achieving legitimacy in responding to non-state aggressors or when intervention in the internal matters of other nations is deemed appropriate. But working through the existing alliance methods to avert conflict or in responding to the actions of other nations is essential to ensure legitimacy of action.
Accordingly, as nations continue to use the assembly and methods of the UN to pursue their national interests, they should rely more on coalitions of the willing to ensure legitimacy of action. These ad hoc arrangements will further ensure that the coalition obtains the appropriate leadership, durable contributions, and participation from nations with common, though varying, security interests.
